Continuous and Effective Self Help and Mutual Aid Nato
Part 3
Chapter 12
by Lord Ismay
Secretary General
of NATO (1952-1957)
Self-help and mutual aid
One of the basic concepts of the North Atlantic Treaty is a recognition of the common interests, the inter-dependence and the developing unity within the North Atlantic Community. NATO is an operating coalition, which depends for its success on collective efforts. It will be recalled that Article 3 of the Treaty reads: 'In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'.
'Continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid' had been a cardinal principle of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, to provide for mutual defence of the five signatory Powers. It was also the basis of the European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan), associating the European NATO members and other European states in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), with which Canada and the United States have developed close working relations. As far as the United States itself was concerned, it was in June, 1948, that the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution, affirming the right to collective self-defence and recommending the association of the United States with regional and collective arrangements based on self-help and mutual aid. Thus was the foundation laid for a North Atlantic mutual defence alliance.
It is clear from the history of the negotiations, as well as from the terms of the Treaty, that the undertakings of Article 3 envisaged action beyond the purely military sphere. It was recognised that the strength of the Alliance depended as much upon the economic soundness of the individual countries and upon the morale of their people as upon the number of military units available for the common defence and the aggregate of their armaments.
We saw in Chapter III that, in carrying out the provisions of Article 3, no country is bound to any specific programme of self-help or mutual aid. Each country merely bound itself to exercise its own judgment as to how to develop and maintain its own capacity to resist aggression and to help others. It is proposed to review in this chapter some of the ways in which member countries have been assisting their partners to achieve both economic and military strength. Mutual aid has taken varying forms, and it is not possible to enumerate or to evaluate them all. It can be said, however, that ever since the Treaty came into force, mutual aid has been a very important element in building up both the defensive and economic strength of the NATO countries.
The strategic need for mutual aid
When the magnitude of the task of defending the North Atlantic area against the Soviet threat was assessed, it was immediately apparent that considerable efforts in self-help and mutual aid would be required in the military as well as in the economic sphere. At the root of the problem, there lay the need for building up armed forces in countries or areas which could by no means support the whole burden of that effort from their own limited resources. In the interest of all members of the Alliance, the Western European mainland with its northern and southern approaches had to be defended. The financial and physical resources of the countries in that area were however wholly inadequate for the task.
The various forms of mutual aid
One solution to the problem was to man and equip military units in the countries which had the resources and send them as expeditionary forces to Europe. In fact, the United Kingdom and the United States already had troops in Germany in 1949, as occupation forces. These were later considerably reinforced and regrouped on a defensive posture.(1)
Another partial solution, was to increase the economic potential of the Western European countries, through self-help and mutual aid, to the level at which an adequate joint defence could be supported. The reconstruction of the Western European economy from the destruction and dislocations left by the last war was already well under way through the individual and joint efforts of the European participants in the European Recovery Programme, with the help of Marshall Plan aid from the United States. This programme was purely one of economic reconstruction with no military implications; but many European member states had, by 1951, achieved a degree of recovery which permitted them to support a defence effort more nearly in keeping with the grim requirements of the times. They were however still far from being able to shoulder the whole burden:
accordingly United States economic aid was continued, though on a diminishing scale and with the changed emphasis that is reflected in the new name of ''defence support aid'.
Meanwhile, the European members were increasing their own military forces. Their main difficulty was to procure the necessary weapons and equipment. This was, and still is, being overcome largely by important deliveries of military equipment, free of charge, by the North American members to their European partners, under the Canadian and United States military aid programmes. Some details of these programmes are given later in this chapter.
It has been seen in Chapter XI how the need for common infrastructure has developed, in pace with the build-up of combined allied forces under NATO's Supreme Commanders. The financing and implementation of agreed NATO infrastructure programmes are noteworthy applications of the concept of mutual aid and burden sharing.
Member countries have granted rights to their partners for construction and use of military facilities, in some cases as part of the NATO common infrastructure programme, in others on a bilateral basis. Many thousands of acres of land have been contributed by European members for facilities such as airfields, training areas, bombing and artillery ranges, barracks, naval base facilities, supply depots, etc., for common use or for the designated use of other members. Some of the ranges require an area of roughly 600 square miles each. Much of this land had to be diverted from agricultural or other productive use.
Other forms of mutual aid have appeared as the need arose, and some are still being developed. A few examples may be given to show their scope and purpose:
- loan of ships and aircraft by the United States and the United Kingdom to other NATO members;
- loan of training grounds;
- training of specialists in Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, especially for the air forces and for the operation of radar equipment. This sort of aid is invaluable, particularly to the smaller countries for whom the capital outlay and the overhead costs involved in the establishment of training schools would create major problems and would be wasteful of funds;
- provision of spare parts for military equipment;
- provision of detailed working drawings for the manufacture of military equipment;
- exchange of engineering data and industrial 'know-how'.
These examples are drawn from the daily activities of NATO and no central accounting has ever been attempted for services thus rendered. Mutual aid in the military field can be considered as one of the greatest achievements of the Alliance. In terms of manpower for the military contingents placed under NATO command, and in land and other facilities made available for joint military use, the European members are contributing by far the greater share - while the North American members are contributing the greater part of the weapons, ammunition and other equipment necessary for the build-up of NATO forces.
The North American contribution
The total money value of the United States and Canadian aid programmes for European NATO countries, in amounts voted from 1948 to April, 1954, is of the order of $ 30,000 million. More than half of this is for military equipment. The balance has been provided in the form of:
1. economic aid (goods, machinery, technical advice and financial support to a value of more than $ 11,500 million);
2. 'intermediate type aid' (financial contributions for specific projects in the defence budgets of certain member countries);
3. training of aircrews and other military personnel.
The scope and magnitude of the economic aid given to European NATO members under the Marshall Plan, and continued in reduced amounts as 'defence support aid' under later United States aid programmes, is indicated above. Its importance in helping to build the sound economic base on which NATO's effectiveness is founded was very great. But during the current phase of NATO's growth, it is the military aid which invites our particular attention.
Canadian aid
The Canadian mutual aid programme began in 1950, in conjunction with the decision of the Canadian Government to re-equip its land forces with American-type equipment. The British-type equipment with which their forces had hitherto been supplied, or which was being kept in reserve stock, was made available to NATO.
From the beginning, Canadian aid has been made available on the basis of multilateral offering to NATO countries. It is transferred to individual European recipients in accordance with Canadian acceptance of allocations recommended either by the Standing Group or by the NATO Secretariat. In this way, the early phases of the Canadian aid programme provided the basic infantry and artillery weapons, motor vehicles, other equipment and ammunition to supply three European ground divisions (one Belgian, one Dutch and one Italian). Much additional equipment, ammunition and explosives have been donated, and every European member nation except Iceland (which has no armed forces) has been the beneficiary of Canadian military assistance.
The later phases of the programme include more than 500 F 86 Sabre jet aircraft with spares, radio sets, early warning radar sets, minesweepers and a wide range of ammunition and explosives. Since Canada is manufacturing much of her equipment to American design, this ensures a degree of standardisation. The value of Canadian end-item aid (i.e. finished articles of military equipment - weapons, vehicles, ammunition, etc.) programmed to the end of March, 1954, was $ 630 million. An additional $ 220 million is budgeted for the financial year 1954-55.
In making up the programme, the Canadian authorities were mindful of the need for keeping in operation the production capacity for certain essential kinds of military equipment. In February, 1953, the Canadian Permanent Representative to the Council spoke of the 'vital importance, in the general NATO interest, of maintaining the production of certain types of equipment which can readily be produced in quantity in Canada but for which the demands alone of our armed services are not sufficient for economic operation'. He added: 'From the outset we have regarded as an important objective of our programme the means which it provides for creating and maintaining in Canada important production facilities that are needed by our North Atlantic partners as well as by ourselves'.
In addition to end-item aid, Canada has also conducted, as we have seen in Chapter IX, training programmes for NATO European pilots and other aircrew at a total cost of over $ 200 million up to the end of March, 1954. More than 2,500 men have completed their training, and nearly 1,000 others are receiving their instruction in Canada. About $ 60 million is budgeted for these programmes for the financial year 1954-55 and their continuance has been approved by Canada for the three subsequent years.
United States aid
The United States economic aid to European countries has been mentioned in Chapter I, and the events which led to the passing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act in 1949 by the United States Congress have been described in Chapter III.
In October, 1951, the United States Mutual Security Act was approved. It brought the economic and military aid legislation together in certain respects and, as a result:
1. the United States military and economic aid programmes became parts of a unified programme;
2. United States dollar assistance was increased for military purposes and reduced for economic purposes;
3. the 'counterpart' funds generated by economic aid - i.e. the special deposits in European currencies made by recipient governments to match the dollar value of the economic aid donated by the United States - were applied increasingly to military purposes, instead of exclusively to economic purposes, as previously.
United States aid to Europe, whether economic, military or 'intermediate', has been furnished on the basis of bilateral agreements negotiated between the United States and the individual recipient countries. The level and the nature of the military aid given to NATO member states is based on the military force goals agreed upon in the course of the Annual Review, the recommendations of the NATO military authorities and the ability of the recipient country to utilise the aid effectively.
By the beginning of April, 1954, the value of military equipment shipped or planned by the United States for delivery to its European partners had reached about $ 15,000 million. The end-items supplied to NATO countries include well over a million small arms, more than twenty thousand artillery pieces and mortars, thousands of tanks and aircraft, and tens of thousands of motor vehicles, to say nothing of ammunition and other equipment. These are impressive figures. In addition, contracts still outstanding cover items ranging from minesweepers to jet aircraft and radar equipment. The United States Administration is also considering helping to maintain the equipment it has supplied by famishing such necessary spare parts as cannot, for technical or economic reasons, be manufactured in Europe.
An important feature of United States aid is the offshore procurement financed as part of the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme (MDAP-OSP). Under this scheme, a portion of the money provided for the MDAP is used to purchase military equipment in countries other than the United States, the equipment then being given to one of America's allies (often the country of manufacture) for its military forces. This scheme is beginning to show significant results. By April, 1954, contracts placed by the United States in European NATO countries amounted to $ 1,727 million (not including $ 388 million of Special Military Support for France). The largest allocation is for ammunition ($ 852 million), with aircraft and related equipment ($ 366 million) and ships ($ 239 million) also accounting for considerable sums. Payments under these contracts reached about $ 280 million by April, 1954.
The concept of offshore procurement is proving to be a happy one, for a number of reasons :
1. it enlarges the European military production base, reduces the dependence on North American sources of supply, and fosters the development and maintenance of modern military production techniques and special skills. In certain instances, it prevents existing European defence production capacity from deteriorating or going out of use;
2. supply lines are shortened, with consequent easing of logistical problems;
3. European unit costs are lower in some instances than United States costs, and packing and shipping charges are smaller; it is therefore possible for a given expenditure in dollars to procure more equipment;
4. the scheme lends general support to the economy of the European member nations by providing not only a means of earning dollars but also employment for many European workers;
5. it is easily dovetailed in with the NATO correlated production programmes for Europe and these two concepts are being developed along lines mutually beneficial and stimulating.
The United States has also provided technical military training for many European soldiers, sailors and airmen, largely to ensure the proper handling and maintenance of the United States supplied equipment.
Dollar payments under economic aid, intermediate type aid, NATO common infrastructure and MDAP-OSP contracts, together with the dollar expenditures of United States forces and other personnel stationed in Europe, have helped to mitigate the most intractable postwar economic problem - the dollar shortage of European countries. Indeed, the total dollar receipts of the European NATO countries from these sources in 1953 were such that they played a great part in enabling those countries to increase their gold and dollar reserves by nearly $ 2,000 million and to relax some of their restrictions on dollar purchases. It should be borne in mind, however, that this way of easing the dollar position of Europe cannot continue indefinitely. While some of the United States expenditures in Europe are of a recurring character, others are not - for example, capital outlays for military bases or NATO common infrastructure projects - and the MDAP offshore purchases now planned will gradually taper off.
With the possible exception of certain special or urgent cases, the need for United States economic ('defence support') aid to European member states should be much reduced in the future since, in any case, offshore procurement contracts and other United States military expenditures in Europe assure large dollar earnings for several years to come. It is also conceivable that in the long run the dependence of European NATO countries on military end-item aid may come to an end, unless, of course, changes in the international situation demand a revision of NATO military requirements. Since, even after April, 1954, military equipment to the value of more than $ 6,000 million remained to be delivered from aid programmes already put in motion, it is not to be expected that the magnitude of any future peacetime programmes will equal those of the past. This is not to say that mutual aid in NATO is likely to decline in importance, but merely that certain aspects of it which have achieved their immediate purpose will come to an end or alter their form.
Accomplishments over five years
The concept of mutual aid, and the philosophy behind it, have led to achievements of lasting importance not only in the defence field but in wider spheres of international co-operation. In the past, it was only after some months or even years of fighting together against a common foe that mutual aid and a measure of co-ordination amongst allied forces were attained. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, schemes of mutual aid have not only been planned, but have actually been put into operation and are functioning successfully in time of peace. It may be asserted without undue optimism that the results have been:
1. a continuous increase in the size and effectiveness of a balanced collective force for the defence of the North Atlantic area;
2. a reduction in the economic strains that the defence build-up imposes upon the member states;
3. the development of the practice of working together, allowing collective plans to be made and common problems to be discussed in a systematical and orderly manner and in an atmosphere free from the stresses of actual warfare.
In 1949 and 1950 experts forecast that the economies of the Western World would suffer catastrophic collapse under the burden of rearmament. What has in fact happened is that, while the total defence expenditure of NATO countries has tripled since 1949 - increasing from less than 20 to more than 60 thousand million dollars a year - the majority of member states have succeeded, in the same period, in maintaining or increasing their net national per capita income. At the same time, the level of employment has risen and has remained high in all countries except two, where the problem of over-population requires special remedies. It is in fact indisputable that all NATO member states are now in a far more robust condition, both economically and militarily, than they were in April, 1949, and that they have all achieved, through self-help and mutual aid, levels of economic and financial health which permit the continuance of substantial military contributions towards the strength of the Alliance.
Practical Advantages Of Mutual Aid
An important aspect of the NATO policy of self-help and mutual aid is the constant search which is being made for the best and most economical use of the resources assigned to the defence of the North Atlantic area. The aim of building maximum defensive strength at the lowest possible cost fits well with the basic strategic concept of balanced, collective NATO forces. The simple consideration by NATO of common defence problems, done as a collective exercise in the Annual Review, in planning common infrastructure, and in countless other day-today activities, makes it possible to achieve substantial economies, an efficient distribution of efforts and to avoid, as far as possible, overlapping and duplication.
Economies result from the selection and use of standard training methods, the joint use of training grounds and other facilities, the selection of the most suitable types of weapons, the sharing of technical knowledge and the agreements reached on correlating defence production programmes. Furthermore the collective use of resources is the sole means of achieving a disposition of forces covering all NATO territories as effectively as possible, without a direct relationship being necessary between the territorial disposition of the forces and the cost of their training and equipment.
In these ways, the burden-sharing of defence takes place in NATO to an extent which is not generally realised. It is achieved not by any single magic formula, but by the daily practice of each of the methods enumerated in this chapter - to recapitulate: the stationing of units from one member state on the territory of another; the training undertaken by the countries which are better equipped for this task; an effective sharing of infrastructure costs; defence support assistance from the United States to European countries, and assistance in the form of military equipment supplied from both the United States and Canada.
Is it possible to translate into financial terms the total economies thus realised and the increased effectiveness of the defence system achieved through NATO's collective efforts? Yes, in the sense that each member country may well calculate what would be the cost of defence of its own territory or of protecting its sea communications, should it have to do so on a national basis and alone. The aggregate estimated costs of such unilateral systems of defence would be a great deal higher than that of the collective system which has been adopted. In any event, NATO countries would be utterly unable to make individually a financial defence effort sufficient to achieve, at best, more than an illusory protection. But above all, a purely national organization would have little defensive value for any of them. The range of modern weapons is so great that no single country, however large and powerful, can protect itself alone. General Elsenhower once said: 'The struggle against the threat of dictatorial aggression has no geographical bounds; it is all one'.
It has been attempted, in this chapter, to analyse how the principles of self-help and mutual aid have been applied by NATO, in peacetime, over the last five years. If, despite all efforts to deter aggression, war were to come to the NATO countries, the whole emphasis of mutual aid would be radically changed. Then would the truly vital forms of self-help and mutual aid be called into play to save the freedom of the Atlantic Community. This would mean the maximum utilisation of national resources for the common cause, the sending of reinforcements to buttress the defences of one's partners, the sharing of equipment and supplies -all with the single aim of repulsing the aggressor and restoring our countries to peace in the shortest possible time. The cost would not be counted then in dollars, sterling or francs, but in men and cities, in families and homes.
It is to avoid the grim realities of a third world war that the voluntary co-operation of the NATO countries should continue and should form a unity stronger and more enduring than that which any aggressively minded Power can impose by force on other nations. Here is mutual aid and self-help in the widest and most enlightened form: standing together and helping each other, first to rid the world of the fear of war, and then to build together a better future.
Related chart:
- Population and Gross National Product of NATO Countries - 1953
- US Economic and Military Aid
- US MDAP Offshore Procurement - 31st March 1954
Footnote:
- See Chapter IV.
Source: https://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/12.htm
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